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Abstract
Background: Neurologists often diagnose brain death (BD) and explain BD to families in the intensive care unit.
This study was designed to determine whether neurologists agree with the standard concept of death (irreversible
loss of integrative unity of the organism) and understand the state of the brain when BD is diagnosed.
Methods: A previously validated survey was mailed to a random sample of 500 board-certified neurologists in the
United States. Main outcomes were: responses indicating the concept of death that BD fulfills and the empirical
state of the brain that would rule out BD.
Results: After the second mailing, 218 (44%) surveys were returned. Few (n = 52, 27%; 95% confidence interval
(CI), 21%, 34%) responded that BD is death because the organism has lost integrative unity. The most common
justification was a higher brain concept (n = 93, 48%; 95% CI, 41%, 55%), suggesting that irreversible loss of
consciousness is death. Contrary to the recent President’s Council on Bioethics, few (n = 22, 12%; 95% CI, 8%, 17%)
responded that the irreversible lack of vital work of an organism is a concept of death that the BD criterion may
satisfy. Many responded that certain brain functions remaining are not compatible with a diagnosis of BD,
including EEG activity, evoked potential activity, and hypothalamic neuroendocrine function. Many also responded
that brain blood flow and lack of brainstem destruction are not compatible with a diagnosis of BD.
Conclusions: American neurologists do not have a consistent rationale for accepting BD as death, nor a clear
understanding of diagnostic tests for BD.
Background
There are two ways to diagnose death: irreversible loss of
circulation, and irreversible loss of all functions of the
brain, including the brainstem [1]. Each is a criterion for
death, because it marks the univocal state of death, the
irreversible loss of the function of the organism as a
whole. Integrative unity of the organism, including resis-
tance of entropy and maintenance of internal homeosta-
sis, is lost, leaving a mere collection of tissues and organs
[1-4]. For medicine, law, and ethics, this is the written
standard rationale for accepting brain death (BD) as a cri-
terion for death [1-4]. The tests used at the bedside to
diagnose BD verify the irreversible loss of all functions of
the brain. Neurologists in the intensive care unit confirm
BD by using a clinical neurologic examination, and once
diagnosed the patient is dead; this diagnosis is “final and
cannot be reversed. The person will never awaken [5].”
Some authors have challenged this paradigm [3,4,6]. In
response, neurologist groups have made it clear that BD
conforms with the law as written in the Uniform Deter-
mination of Death Act (UDDA), with “accepted medical
standards” [7-11] and that “it will be hard to find a physi-
cian closely involved with BD determination and organ
donation who does not think those [BD patients] are
dead [9].”
We designed a survey to determine whether board-
certified neurologists in the United States agree with the
standard concept of death (defined by the President’s
Commission and neurologist groups as the irreversible
loss of integrative unity of the organism [1-4,6,10,11]),
and understand the criterion of death (irreversible loss
of all functions of the brain, including the brainstem),
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tests used to confirm BD. We hypothesized that neurol-
ogists would not be aware of the standard paradigm jus-
tifying the diagnosis of death and would not understand
the empirical state of patients determined dead based
on the criterion of BD. This is important because the
American Academy of Neurology suggests that neurolo-
gists have special expertise in declarations of BD [7,8].
Methods
Questionnaire administration
This study was a prospective survey of a random sam-
pling of board-certified neurologists in the United States
regarding their opinions about BD. The mailing list was
obtained from Healthcare Lists Division SDI (Yardley,
PA) in August 2009. Each neurologist was mailed the
survey in January 2010, along with a $5 gift certificate to
encourage them to have a coffee while filling out the
questionnaire. A cover letter asked participants to com-
plete the survey and mail it back in the addressed,
stamped envelope. A second mailing was done in May
2010 to nonresponders. All responses were received by
July 2010. The cover letter stated, “We are sending you
a short questionnaire asking your opinions around some
of the concepts surrounding BD. We want to sample
the opinions regarding the concept of BD. Your
responses are voluntary and confidential.” The study
was approved by our university health ethics research
board.
Questionnaire development
The development and initial testing of the instrument
are described in more detail elsewhere [12,13]. The cur-
rent instrument (Additional File 1) is identical to that
used in a survey of Canadian pediatric intensivists and
Canadian neurosurgeons, with the following changes: (a)
in the first question about acceptable conceptual reasons
to explain BD, we added the choice “cessation of the
vital work of a living organism–t h ew o r ko fs e l fp r e s e r -
vation, achieved through the organism’sn e e dd r i v e n
commerce with the surrounding world” as stated by the
President’s Council; and (b) we modified the scenario
regarding family refusal to stop “life support” in a brain-
dead patient to describe continued support for 8 months
until ventilator withdrawal, and asked “w a st h i sp a t i e n t
dead for the last 8 months?” and if the patient, during
the last 8 months, was doing any of the three vital activ-
ities stated by the President’s Council to indicate life
(Additional File 1) [14].
To generate the items for inclusion in the question-
naire, we searched MEDLINE from 1996 to 2004 for
articles on BD, followed by review of the relevant article
reference lists. The new questions described above were
based on the President’s Council White Paper [14]. To
ensure clarity, realism, validity, and ease of completion,
initial pilot testing was done by having five local pedia-
tric intensivists, one local pediatrician, and one local
organ donation coordinator complete the questionnaire,
followed by a semistructured interview for feedback.
Statistical analysis
Certain definitions were made a priori for two of the
survey questions. The first question asked the respon-
dent to choose from a list of “stand-alone” reason(s)
that “is/are an acceptable conceptual reason to explain
why ‘brain death’ is equivalent to ‘death’.” The seventh
question asked, “This patient fulfills all brain death cri-
teria unequivocally, including the suitable interval. Con-
ceptually, why are they dead (i.e., in your own words,
what is it about loss of brain function, including the
brainstem, that makes this patient dead)?” For analysis,
we classified responses into categories that have been
discussed in the literature, including loss of integration
concept of BD, higher brain concept of BD, prognosis
concept of BD, and statement of the criterion only.
Anonymous data were entered into REDCap Survey
(Version 1.3.9-
©2010 Vanderbilt University) and
uploaded to the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS, Inc., Chicago, IL) version 15.0 for Win-
dows. We analyzed responses using standard descriptive
tabulations and give adjusted Wald 95% confidence
intervals (95% CI).
Results
The questionnaire was mailed to a random sample of
500 board-certified neurologists in the United States;
after the second mailing, 218 (44%) had been returned.
Of the 218 returned, 26 (12%) did not have data that
could be analyzed: 24 were returned to sender, and 2
were returned blank. Therefore, there were 192 of 477
(40.3%) eligible surveys returned with data for analysis.
The first question asked, “Which of several choices is
an acceptable stand-alone conceptual reason to explain
why BD is equivalent to death.” Fifty-two (27%; 95% CI,
21-34%) chose the irreversible loss of the integration of
body functions by the brain, 22 (12%; 8-17%) a cessation
of the vital work of the organism, and almost half (48%;
41-55%) used a higher brain concept (Table 1).
The next two questions asked about which objective
test results, or pathology results (in a patient main-
tained as BD for 48 hours), would not be compatible
with BD. A majority of respondents were unaware of
the findings their patients may have when diagnosed
with BD (Table 2).
The next three questions asked about the timing of
BD in different patient situations. When faced with a
patient who has EEG activity yet fulfills BD criteria, 26
(14%; 9-19%) consider the patient dead at the first BD
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tion, and 90 (47%; 40-54%) only when the EEG became
isoelectric 12 hours later. When faced with a pregnant
patient with BD supported for 11 weeks until delivery,
most agreed the patient was dead by the first (36, 19%;
14-25%) or second (119, 62%; 55-69%) examination.
However, in this brain-dead pregnant patient, 36 (19%;
1 4 - 2 5 % )a n s w e r e dt h a ts h ew a sn o ta c t u a l l yd e a du n t i l
sometime later: 11 (6%; 3-10%) after delivery of the neo-
nate, 19 (10%; 6-15%) after organs are recovered and the
Table 1 Responses to the question on conceptual reasons to explain why brain death is equivalent to death




Higher brain concept 93 (48%) 41-55%
Irreversible loss of consciousness 82 (43%) 36-50%
Irreversible loss of the soul or “essence” of humans 39 (20%) 15-27%
Irreversible loss of “personhood” 43 (22%) 17-29%
Irreversible loss of the integration of body functions by the brain 52 (27%) 21-34%
Prognosis concept 59 (31%) 25-38%
The certainty of cardiac arrest within hours or days 14 (7%) 4-12%
Further care is futile and/or degrading 53 (28%) 22-34%
Restatement of loss of brain function (the criterion) 169 (88%) 83-92%
Irreversible loss of the function of the entire brain/brainstem 140 (73%) 66-79%
Irreversible loss of the critical functions of the entire brain/brainstem 105 (55%) 48-62%
Irreversible destruction of the brain, including the brainstem 109 (57%) 50-64%
Irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness plus irreversible loss of the capacity to
breathe
83 (43%) 36-50%
Cessation of the vital work of the organism 22 (12%) 8-17%
The exact question asked was as follows: “Which of the following is/are an acceptable conceptual reason to explain why ‘brain death’ is equivalent to ‘death’?.”
Respondents could choose more than one answer; each answer had to be “a stand-alone reason.” The standard medical, ethical, and legal conceptual reason is:
the irreversible loss of the integration of body functions by the brain [1-4,10,11].
Table 2 The objective findings that respondents considered would not be compatible with brain death
Finding This would not be compatible with brain death (n = 192)
[n (%; 95% confidence interval)]
Actual percentage of clinically diagnosed brain death
cases with this finding [15,16]
Objective test
Some EEG activity 135 (70%; 63-76%)) > 20%
Some evoked
potential activity
107 (56%; 49-63%) > 5%
Some cerebral blood
flow
99 (52%; 45-59%) > 5-40%
Some pituitary
hormones
17 (9%; 6-14%) > 50%
Normal brainstem
pathology
36 (19%; 14-25%) > 10-40%




81 (42%; 35-49%) > 5-40%
Cerebral cortex
minimal damage
63 (33%; 27-40%) > 5-40%
Damage but not
respirator brain
27 (14%; 10-20%) > 5-40%
Widespread necrosis 1 (1%; 0-3%) > 50%
None of the above 93 (48%; 41-55%) Unknown
EEG = electroencephalogram
The standard medical, ethical, and legal tests for brain death only require clinical bedside tests; EEG, brainstem evoked potential, brain blood flow, or pituitary
hormone testing are not required nor recommended [1,5,7,8,11,24,25]. In addition, brain pathology is not obtained as part of the diagnosis of brain death.
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times. When faced with a brain-dead patient who has
no cerebral blood flow but a family who insists on con-
tinued life support for the next months, and asked “was
this patient dead for the last 8 months,” 31 (16%; 12-
22%) responded “no.” When asked if this patient was
performing vital work during those months, 164 (85%;
80-90%) responded no, and 30 (15%; 11-21%) responded
yes [receptive to stimuli, 9 (5%; 2-9%); acting upon the
world, 5 (3%; 1-6%), and carrying out basic (non-con-
scious) felt needs, 16 (8%; 5-13%)].
The next two questions asked again about the under-
lying conceptual basis of BD: “In your own words, what
is it about loss of brain function including the brainstem
that makes this patient dead?” and “Prior to this survey,
had you thought about why, at a conceptual level, brain
death is equivalent to death of the patient?” Only 21
(11%; 7-16%) of respondents had not previously thought
about why BD is equivalent to death. In their own
words, only 15 (8%; 5-13%) used a loss of integration
concept (Table 3).
The next question asked which choice “best describes
why you are comfortable diagnosing death based on the
criteria of brain death?” Most (133, 69%; 62-75%)
responded that “the conceptual basis of brain death
makes it equivalent to death of the patient.” Many
responded that the reason is because it is a standard: an
accepted medical standard (46, 24%; 18-30%), an
accepted legal standard (24, 13%; 8-18%), and/or “the
diagnosis of brain death was taught to me during my
training” (14, 7%; 4-12%). Five (3%; 1-6%) were not com-
fortable diagnosing death based on BD.
The final question asked: “Are brain death and cardiac
death the same state (i.e., are both death of the
patient)?” More than half (104, 54%; 47-61%) chose
“no,” 86 (45%; 38-52%) chose “yes,” and 2 (1%; 0-4%)
left the answer blank.
Further analysis was done for those 133 (69%) who
responded that they were comfortable diagnosing BD,
because “the conceptual basis of brain death makes it
equivalent to death of the patient.” Their responses to
the question asking to state the concept of BD in their
own words is shown in Table 3. Only 13 (10%; 6-16%)
used a loss of integration concept, and 59 (44%; 36-53%)
did not articulate a concept (i.e., used a restatement of
the criterion or left no response). On the first question,
only 39 (29%; 22-38%) considered “irreversible loss of
the integration of body functions by the brain” as an
acceptable conceptual reason to explain BD being
equivalent to death and 67 (50%; 42-59%) chose a higher
brain conceptual reason.
Discussion
The American Academy of Neurology recently updated
their evidence-based guideline for determining BD in
adults, reaffirming that irreversible cessation of all func-
tions of the entire brain, including the brainstem, can be
determined “based on straightforward principles,” and is
Table 3 Response to the question about what, in the respondent’s own words, makes a patient dead
Concept given to justify why
brain death is death
Neurologist responses (n = 192) [n
(%; 95% confidence interval)]
Neurologists who agreed the conceptual basis makes brain death
equivalent to death (n = 133) [n (%; 95% confidence interval)]
Higher brain concept 63 (33%; 27-40%) 52 (39%; 31-48%)
Loss of integration of body
concept
15 (8%; 5-13%) 13 (10%; 6-16%)
Loss of integration alone 7 (4%; 2-7%) 7 (5%; 2-11%)
Loss of integration
combined with higher brain
concept
8 (4%; 2-8%) 6 (5%; 2-10%)
Prognosis concept 9 (5%; 2-9%) 5 (4%; 1-9%)
Prognosis of death certain 7 (4%; 2-7%) 3 (2%; 1-7%)
Quality of life statement 2 (1%; 0-4%) 2 (2%; 0-6%)
No concept given 96 (50%; 43-57%) 59 (44%; 36-53%)
Re-statement only: loss of
brain function (the criterion)
32 (17%; 12-23%) 23 (17%; 12-25%)
No response (blank) 64 (33%; 27-40%) 36 (27%; 20-35%)
Vital work of organism concept
a 4 (2%; 1-5%) 0 (0%; 0-2%)
Other 9 (5%; 2-9%) 4 (3%; 1-8%)
The exact question was as follows: “This patient fulfills all brain death criteria unequivocally including the suitable interval. Conceptually, why are they dead (i.e.,
in your own words, what is it about loss of brain function including the brainstem that makes this patient dead)?” The standard medical, ethical, and legal
conceptual reason is (as defined by the President’s Commission and neurologist groups): the irreversible loss of the integration of body functions by the brain
[1-4,10,11].
aResponses were: “cannot independently sustain itself"; “irreversible loss of interaction with the environment and no ability to function"; “no longer capable of
any activity that leads to self preservation"; and “the organism is no longer capable of interacting with the environment internally or externally.”
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potential flaws with this claim. First, most neurologists
do not understand (at best) or disagree (at worst) with
the standard concept that BD is death because the
organism has lost integrative unity. The most common
justification given by neurologists was a higher brain
concept, suggesting that irreversible loss of conscious-
ness is death. Very few neurologists consider the irrever-
sible lack of vital work of an organism as a concept of
death that the BD criterion may satisfy. Second, most
neurologists do not understand (at best) or disagree (at
worst) that certain brain functions, including EEG activ-
ity, evoked potential activity, and hypothalamic neuroen-
docrine function, often can remain in patients diagnosed
dead using accepted tests that have confirmed the BD
criterion [15]. This suggests that these neurologists
think that clinical tests for BD produce many false-posi-
tive diagnoses of death. Third, most neurologists did not
understand (at best) or disagree (at worst) that brain
blood flow and lack of brain destruction often can occur
in patients diagnosed dead using accepted tests confirm-
ing the BD criterion [15,16].T h i ss u g g e s t st h a tt h e r e
may be concern (or confusion) about whether BD marks
the point of irreversible loss of brain functions. Finally,
most neurologists do not consider the criterion BD and
circulatory death as each diagnostic of the univocal state
of death.
The concept of death
BD is said to be death by most professional bodies
because it satisfies the concept/definition of death
(Table 4): loss of integrative unity of the organism as a
w h o l e ,m a r k i n gw h e na no r g a n i s mi sn ol o n g e ra n
organism because it no longer can resist the forces of
entropy and no longer can maintain internal homeosta-
sis [1-4]. Many have argued that integrative unity of the
organism as a whole often continues during BD (hence,
integration is not dependent on functions of the brain),
and a central integrator is not required for life; there-
f o r e ,m a n yn ol o n g e rc o n s i d e rt h i sac o n c e p to fd e a t h
that BD satisfies [3,6,14]. Loss of personhood, based on
irreversible loss of consciousness (sentience, or agency)
is necessary, but not sufficient, for death (Table 4) [3,4].
Although nonconscious patients may be allowed to die
due to their profound neurological disability, no society
h a sa c c e p t e dt h a tt h e ya r ea l r e a d yd e a d .I tm a yb et r u e
that BD patients have poor quality of life or certainty of
cardiac arrest in a short period; however, this denotes a
prognosis and not a diagnosis of death. The President’s
Council suggested a novel concept of death: that vital
external work of an organism is required to be alive,
and once an organism no longer interacts with the
environment to obtain what it needs to survive, it is
dead [14]. Importantly, simply restating the criterion of
BD does not give any concept of death that BD satisfies
to justify BD being death.
This survey shows that neurologists do not understand
if, or disagree whether, the criterion BD fulfils a concept
of death. Few consider irreversible loss of integration of
the organism as a whole or irreversible loss of the ability
to perform external vital work as a reason to accept BD
as death (some even consider that external work con-
tinues during BD). Many confused a restatement of the
criterion of BD as justification that it is death, and a few
conflated the prognosis of death with the diagnosis of
death. Most consider a higher brain concept of death
justified. This is concerning because neurologists often
are the specialist declaring BD and explaining it to
families in the intensive care unit.
The tests of BD
The tests for BD are performed to confirm that irrever-
sible loss of all functions of the brain, including the
brainstem, has occurred. It has been shown that some
brain functions continue after accurately clinically diag-
nosed BD, including EEG activity in 20%, evoked poten-
tial activity in 5%, and hypothalamic neuroendocrine
function in > 50% [15]. These activities may be
explained by the finding that continued brain blood flow
occurs in 5-40% of BD patients, and pathologic destruc-
tion of brain does not occur in more than 40% of BD
patients (even after over 24-48 hr of maintained circula-
tion) [15,16]. The ongoing brain functions have been
explained with several controversial claims (Table 4)
[3,4,15,17-19]. First, these are mere activities and not
functions; however, the brain seems too complex an
o r g a nt os i m p l ym a k et h i sc l a i m[ 3 , 1 7 ] .S e c o n d ,t h e s e
are insignificant functions; however, this is an ad hoc
claim [3,4,15,17]. Third, these are not critical clinical
functions, and BD is a clinical diagnosis; however, this
claim is both ad hoc and circular (critical clinical func-
tions are necessary for maintenance of life, and death is
the loss of critical clinical functions, is a trivial tautolo-
gous statement) [3,17]. Fourth, these are not critical
functions, because they are replaceable mechanically;
however, this would only lead to a higher brain con-
sciousness based concept of death [3,4,15,17-19].
This survey shows that most neurologists do not
understand, or disagree, that certain brain functions can
remain in patients diagnosed dead using accepted clini-
cal tests confirming the BD criterion. This may suggest
that the accepted medical standard of clinical tests for
BD can produce false-positive diagnoses of death. At the
very least, the neurologists often are unaware of (or
worse, disagree with) the debates regarding the meaning
of significant, critical, clinical, brain functions.
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The conceptual or empirical arguments in favor of brain death Problems with the argument
The concept of death fulfilled by the brain death criterion
Irreversible loss of integrative unity of the organism as a whole Integrative unity continues during BD: there are many reports of
gestation of a fetus, waste detoxification and excretion, assimilation of
nutrients, fighting of infections, wound healing, proportionate growth,
and sexual maturation [6,14]. Without intensive care, BD patients will
surely die quickly; but this is similar to many intensive care patients who
are clearly live integrated organisms, such as those with cervical spine
injury, on extracorporeal life support, etc.
A central integrator is not required: embryos are alive [3,17].
Irreversible loss of personhood, consciousness, or moral agency (higher
brain)
Consciousness is not the dividing line between life and death: irreversible
vegetative state, anencephaly, and if moral agency is required, infants
and the severely demented are not considered already dead (appropriate
for burial, cremation, autopsy, or organ recovery) [3,4,17].
Although consciousness may be a sign of ongoing integration, it can be
lost with continued integration of the organism as a whole [3,4,6,17].
Poor quality of life or certainty of cardiac arrest Conflate prognosis of death with a diagnosis of death. A prognosis of
lack of recovery of neurological function is not a diagnosis of death.
Irreversible loss of the vital external work of an organism interacting with
the environment to obtain what it needs
Brain-dead bodies are receptive to stimuli/signals from the surrounding
environment (e.g., clot blood at and heal tracheostomy and gastric tube
incisions; have withdrawal spinal reflexes; react with hypertension and
tachycardia to organ recovery).
Brain dead bodies do act upon the world to obtain selectively what they
need (e.g., assimilate nutrients/electrolytes from fluids/feeds; eliminate
unneeded wastes in stool/urine; exchange gases with the world in
ventilated lungs).
Brain dead bodies do have basic (non-conscious) felt needs that drive
the organism to obtain what it needs (e.g., the drive to circulate blood
with oxygen/nutrients to sustain its vital organs, to absorb needed
nutrients and eliminate unneeded wastes from the bowel, to acquire
needed oxygen from the lungs) to allow growth, sexual maturation, and
recovery from complications.
The goal of external work is to sustain the “capacity for internal
integrative unity": external work is “a second-order activity mandated by
the primary work of an organism, the maintenance of internal
homeostasis [19].”
Irreversible loss of the function (or the critical functions) of the entire
brain, irreversible destruction of the brain, or irreversible loss of the
capacity for consciousness and breathing.
These simply restate the criterion of brain death; they do not give a
concept of death to justify the criterion being death itself.
Empirical continuing brain activity after a valid clinical diagnosis of
brain death is pronounced
Residual functions detected in brain death are actually mere activities (of
“nests” of cells) and not functions.
The brain is too complex an organ to simply make this ad hoc and likely
incorrect claim [3,17]:
The spatial resolution of EEG suggests there is widespread neuronal
activity when EEG activity is detected, potentially performing functions
317.
Evoked potential activity is due to transduction of ambient energy into
electrochemical signals conducted to the brain, suggestive of a function
317.
Neuroendocrine control maintains free water homeostasis, suggestive of
a function 34617.
Residual functions detected in brain death are insignificant functions. This claim is ad hoc (without a clear reason): why are pupillary and
corneal reflexes significant functions reflecting integration of the
organism as a whole, while EEG activity, evoked potential activity,
neuroendocrine control, and breathing at a PaCO2 of 80 mmHg are not
[3,15,17]?
Residual functions are neither critical nor clinical functions, and BD is a
clinical diagnosis.
This claim is ad hoc (without a clear reason): how to define critical, and
why these must be clinical functions is not explained [3,15,17].
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First, we assumed that there is a “standard concept of
death.” However, we included in the survey all the con-
cepts offered in the literature and also provided an oppor-
tunity to provide a new concept in the open-ended
question. Although we found that most neurologists did
not agree with the concept of loss of integrative unity, the
main alternative was a higher brain concept. This would
imply that patients with permanent vegetative state are
dead in their state of wakefulness and breathing. Second,
perhaps the finding that 97% of neurologists are comforta-
ble diagnosing death based on BD only shows that neurol-
ogists are not able to justify explicitly why the equivalency
truly holds. After all, this is a philosophical question and
may not involve terminology used in clinical training. Per-
h a p st h em a i nf i n d i n go ft h es u r v e yi su n c o v e r i n ga n
unmet neurologists’ educational need. Although a poten-
tial interpretation, this may not be reassuring to families
who are told that their loved one is dead based on the cri-
terion BD. In addition, the American Board of Psychiatry
and Neurology lists an understanding of BD on the objec-
tives of training [20]. Third, although the survey did not
determine this, perhaps neurologists accept BD as “dead
enough” for organ donation and withdrawal of life-support
purposes. Accordingly, patients with BD should be allowed
to die or should be treated as if they no longer are part of
the human moral community; but, this is different than
being biologically dead. We agree with other authors who
have suggested that if BD is not death, whether BD can be
considered a state where vital organ donation complies
with nonmaleficence (death is an unavoidable and mini-
mal harm) and autonomy (with informed consent)
requires further discussion and debate [21].
Limitations and strengths
The relatively small sample size, only modest response
rate to this survey, and lack of information regarding
respondents’ exposure to BD patients are significant lim-
itations. In addition, the closed-ended questions may not
have allowed respondents to elaborate and clarify their
responses. The strengths of the survey include the devel-
opment methodology, and unambiguous nature of most
of the questions. In addition, the striking similarity of
our results to those of other surveys done in the past,
including using this same survey in different populations
of North American nonneurologist medical specialists,
enhances the generalizability of the results [12,13,22-24].
The preponderance of evidence from this survey, and
other surveys, support the conclusions we have drawn.
Conclusions
Neurologists do not have a consistent rationale for accept-
ing BD as death, nor a clear understanding of the diagnos-
tic tests for BD. Almost half accept BD because it is a state
of permanent unconsciousness, and more than half do not
consider it equivalent to circulatory death. Wijdicks, in
explaining that BD is a clinical diagnosis, and that confir-
matory tests are not needed, asks “So, what are neurolo-
gists confirming?” [25]. Unfortunately, he does not answer
this question, and only claims that “confirmatory tests do
not confirm anything [because BD] is synonymous with a
certain clinical state [from which] there are no recoveries
on record.... [25]“ Similarly, the American Academy of
Neurology and the Canadian Forum Brain Death Guide-
lines suggest that BD is death because of its prognosis
(claiming it is irreversible) and lack of consciousness
[7,8,26]. If BD is death, a conceptual rationale for this
should be clarified. This has important ethical implications
for the practice of intensive care medicine.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Brain Death Survey. The survey sent out to American
neurologists asking for their opinions regarding brain death.
Table 4 Conceptual and empirical arguments in favor of brain death, and problems with those arguments (Continued)
The clinical versus nonclinical distinction is irrelevant: neurologists’
epistemic access to a function is not a relevant consideration to
diagnosis of a critical function [3,17].
The clinical versus nonclinical distinction is false: neuroendocrine control
can be diagnosed at the bedside by observing lack of polyuria [3,17].
The critical versus noncritical distinction is circular: critical functions are
necessary for maintenance of life, and death is the loss of critical
functions, is a trivial tautologous argument [3,17].
Residual functions are not critical because they are replaceable
mechanically.
Breathing can be replaced mechanically and, therefore, is not a critical
brain function. Like the dialysis machine replacing spontaneous kidney
function, the ventilator replacing spontaneous brainstem control of
breathing is irrelevant as to whether an organism is dead [3,4,15,17,18].
Only consciousness cannot be replaced mechanically and, therefore, this
is only an argument for a consciousness based (not integration, or vital
external work based) concept of death [3,4,15,17,18].
BD = brain death; EEG = electroencephalogram.
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